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A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 
.Daniel N. Hoffman* 
UNDECLARED WAR: TwILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER. 
By Edward Keynes. University Park, Pa. and London: The Penn-
sylvania State University Press. 1982. Pp. ix, 236. $17.95. 
THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS. By Ann Van "Wynen Thomas 
andA.J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 
1982. Pp. xiii, 177. $15. 
In Undeclared War, Professor Edward Keynes has set himself the 
task of assessing, first, the intent of the Framers regarding the scope 
and distribution of the constitutional war powers; second, the appro-
priate role of the judiciary in resolving doubts and conflicts about 
those powers (with special reference to the "political question" doc-
trine); and third, the actual record of judicial involvement with these 
questions. In general Keynes deserves high marks for the historical 
accuracy and right-thinking character of his conclusions, though I 
have some reservations about the clarity of the exposition and the 
comprehensiveness of coverage. 
Keynes is at his best in his review of the Framers' effort to subject 
war-making to the rule of law. His conclusions cannot be repeated 
too often in these sorry times, when the regnant doctrine often ap-
pears to be an outright monarchism in everything but name. Lest 
this statement be thought extreme, recall that when President Rich-
ard Nixon wished to assure the Supreme Court that he was not 
claiming monarchical powers, he could concede only that the Presi-
dent does not serve for life. 1 During his tenure, presumably, the 
President's sovereign prerogative has no limit and his will is law. 
Nixon's successors have not been discernibly more restrained in their 
bold constitutional claims; nor, as Keynes would agree, has the 
Supreme Court really laid these claims to rest. 
• Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of South Florida. A.B. Uni-
versity of Chicago; J.D. Harvard; Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor 
Hoffman is the author of GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981) and the coauthor (with Morton Halperin) of FREEDOM 
VS. NATIONAL SECURITY: SECRECY AND SURVEILLANCE (1977) and TOP SECRET: NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977). - Ed. 
l. Brief for the Respondent at n.43, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted 
in US v. NIXON 352 (L. Friedman ed. 1974). 
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Every schoolchild ought to know that the Framers were anti-
monarchist if they were anything. In Keynes's words: 
In contrast to the modem view of the President as a king-general who 
exercises prerogative or discretionary power to make foreign policy, 
initiate war, and conclude peace treaties, the Framers had a limited 
conception of executive authority. Since the Constitution's authors be-
lieved that governmental power would threaten liberty, they separated 
and shared various powers of war, defense, and foreign affairs between 
Congress and the President. [P. 2]. 
In a constitutional system that incorporates the principle of popular 
sovereignty, such concepts as federative and prerogative powers are in-
vitations to revolution by a weary people whose blood and treasure 
have been spent in the foreign wars and military adventures that such 
theories encourage. [P. 12]. 
It should therefore scarcely be necessary to belie, as Keynes does, 
"the argument that inherent, prerogative, or sovereign power de-
volved from the British Crown to the President of the United States 
in an unbroken chain of events between 1776 and 1789" (p. 25). Yet 
it is necessary; for, remarkably, that argument has commended itself 
not only to presidents, but to the Supreme Court.2 
As my own research has shown,3 the record of the founding pe-
riod lends no support to such a heretical doctrine. What the record 
does show is a fairly persistent presidential impatience with power 
sharing, and a notably inconsistent congressional response reflecting 
the disruptive impact of international crises and partisan calcula-
tions upon the development of consistent, principled norms of inter-
branch relations. Though the Framers had clearly expected that 
Congress would set the fundamentals of policy and the President 
would carry it out, from early on Congress had major difficulties in 
agreeing on any policy, much less on a policy with which the Presi-
dent might feel comfortable. His built-in advantages of structural 
unity, control of information, and administrative command provided 
repeated temptations to initiate decisive action, not merely propose 
it. When challenged, early presidents sometimes advanced constitu-
tional justifications for their actions that bore scarcely any resem-
blance to the orthodoxy of 1787-1789. They did so with increasing 
boldness as their legislative counterparts failed to develop and en-
force a consistent rebuttal. 
Part of the problem was the sketchiness of the constitutional 
plan. While Keynes argues persuasively that absolutist doctrines are 
neither necessary nor proper for filling in the gaps, there is and was 
much room for rhetorical maneuvering that can give such doctrines 
a certain veneer of legitimacy. But more basically, the tension be-
2. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). 
3. See D. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981). 
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tween the war power and the rule of law runs so deep that any effort 
to subject the former to the latter is apt, in difficult times, to seem 
inconvenient or even suicidal. 
Keynes's effort to rationalize and justify the Framers' design fo-
cuses on the distinction between offensive and defensive military op-
erations. In his view: 
Only Congress can change the nation's condition from one of peace to 
war, but the President, as civilian commander in chief, can repel sud-
den attacks on U.S. territory, the nation's armed forces, and its public 
ships at sea. The President can also employ the armed forces to protect 
citizens' lives and property. [P. 34]. 
Insofar as the Framers intended to vest any war powers in the Presi-
dent, these powers were defensive. [P. 36]. 
I find this argument seriously flawed. For one thing, the historical 
documentation is curiously indirect.4 Despite the fact that the offen-
sive/ defensive distinction was apparently well known to interna-
tional law neither the Constitution nor the surrounding debates 
explicitly relied upon it. As I view the record, the Framers clearly 
wished to subject the war powers to the rule oflaw, but wanted to do 
so in a manner consistent not only with realistic, effective govern-
ment, but also with the expansive destiny of what many called their 
"infant empire." In establishing a stronger executive, then, their 
central concern was not the special moral and legal status of defen-
sive operations, but the need for "vigor, secrecy, and dispatch" in 
foreign and military affairs generally. Executive power was pre-
ferred in light of both the proclivity of legislatures for drawn-out 
deliberations and the crucial fact that Congress was in those days 
very likely to be in recess when a crisis aro~e.5 Thus it was clearly 
essential to empower the President to repel sudden attack, but one 
can argue, and presidents did, that similar considerations empow-
ered him to do more, certainly when Congress was in recess, and 
conceivably even when it was in session, so long as the steps taken 
did not amount to "declaring war" - that is, to an open-ended com-
mitment of lives and property for a major military operation against 
a European power.6 
In this connection, there has been too little discussion of the con-
stitutional provision that if an emergency arises during congressional 
4. Keynes relies on the facts that the Constitution requires the President to take an oath to 
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" which "implies an obligation to defend the 
people and their government against sudden attack," p. 164, and that a "stylistic" change made 
in article I - giving Congress the power to "declare" war rather than "make" war - ''was 
· intended to allow the President, as co=ander in chief, to respond to sudden attacks rather 
than to co=ence offensive war." Pp. 35-36. 
5. Congressional sessions in the founding period typically occupied less than half the year. 
6. Attacks on Indian tribes, Barbary pirates, and nonwhite "savages" did not require the 
formality of declaring war. 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:997 
recess, the President "may" - not shall - convene them into special 
session.7 The records of the Convention do not show what calcula-
tions, if any, supported this fateful decision of the Framers. But as 
early as 1793, when war broke out in Europe, Washington used his 
discretion to avoid convening Congress and to issue a presidential 
Proclamation of Neutrality instead. While Representative Madison 
argued that this move derogated the congressional war powers, 8 
when Congress finally convened the political situation impelled not 
a confrontation with the President, but a ratification of his policy.9 
The success of these preemptive tactics soon led to even bolder ex-
periments along similar lines. 
In 1794, Congress moved to enact legislation, regulating foreign 
commerce, that was too anti-British for the President's taste. He 
thwarted it by commencing treaty negotiations with Britain on the 
same topics, and ultimately, in 1796, by signing a treaty pledging the 
country not to adopt laws of the sort Congress had proposed. When 
the House of Representatives protested, Washington told them 
sternly that they had no right to usurp the treaty power confided 
solely to him and the Senate, and that they were bound to appropri-
ate the funds necessary to implement the treaty regardless of what 
they thought of its merits. Io In truth, the Senate's checking role had 
already degenerated from the original design of an executive council 
that advised and consented at every stage of treaty negotiations to a 
last-minute take-it-or-leave-it ratifier, that was neither fully in-
formed as to the course of the negotiations nor allowed to inform its 
constituents and take their views on the treaty's contents. Long 
before the modem invention of executive agreements - a develop-
ment Keynes ignores - the Senate's role had become decidedly 
subordinate. I I In instance after instance - in matters not involving 
sudden attacks upon the United States - an executive acting with 
vigor, secrecy, and dispatch presented Congress with a fait accompfi 
in foreign affairs. 
It was not only congressional powers that suffered in the wake of 
foreign crises, but civil liberties as well. Already by 1798, executive 
arrogance had inflated to the point where public criticism of either 
the administration or its policies was made a criminal act; and the 
federal courts zealously enforced the Sedition Law against the oppo-
sition press. The rationale for this repressive episode did not depend 
7. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
8. J. MADISON, Heldivius No. IV, 1 LETTERS AND Or!iER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
643 (Philadelphia 1865). 
9. These events are more fully recounted and analyzed in D. HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 
88-104. 
IO. Id. at 131-77. 
1 I. Id. at 61-69, 80-82, 133-47. 
February 1984] War Powers 1001 
on the defensive nature of the foreign and military policies under 
attack, but on the offensive nature of the Federalist party's political 
strategy and its elitist views on mass participation. And its end, with 
Jefferson's election to the presidency, signalled less a return to con-
stitutional orthodoxy than a reinforcement of the view that what 
counts is to have the right demigod at the helm.12 
Keynes concedes that the offense/ defense principle may be an 
inadequate restraint on presidential power in today's very different 
world (pp. 165-67). In my view the early history shows that it never 
was adequate. Even if the nature. of warfare has changed, the ten-
dency of combatants to claim that they are acting in self-defense is 
surely not new; nor is the phenomenon of a Congress reluctant to 
challenge presidential initiatives for fear of being branded subver-
sive, appeasing, or otherwise irresponsible. The vagueness of the of-
fense/ defense doctrine only reinforces the ambivalence that inheres 
in Congress as an institution. While presidents may be expected res-
olutely to defend the power of their office, congressional leaders 
have often, in refutation of Madison's brilliant theoretical argument 
in The Federalist No. 51 13 (but in emulation of his actual strategy as 
a member of the House) tried to capture the presidency for them-
selves or their party rather than to try to weaken it. This "fusion" 
(Keynes's term; some would say presidential usurpation) of the na-
tional war powers may have been legitimated by the Supreme Court 
only in the 1860's,14 but the process was already far along by 1800. 
Can today's courts be expected to restore a more balanced consti-
tutional framework? Keynes discusses the judicial role at great 
length from both theoretical and historical perspectives. He argues 
rather convincingly that the classical "political question" doctrine, 
properly understood, does not preclude judicial arbitration of inter-
branch conflicts, since its rationale applies only where a power is 
clearly committed to a single branch, not where it is shared by two 
branches jointly (p. 69). Yet he cannot and does not claim that the----------
Supreme Court has accepted this view.15 The modem Court has 
12. Id at 178-220. 
13. [T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the neces-
sary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . • 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be con-
nected with the constitutional rights of the place. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (H. Lodge ed. 1892). 
14. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
15. He does suggest that support for this view may be found in Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486 (1969). P. 135. The seminal case, Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849), seems 
to take a contrary line, as does Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, 
444 U.S. 996 (1979), a case which Keynes mysteriously omits. Keynes also misleads in imply-
ing, p. 63, that John Marshall rejected entirely the propriety of abstention from deciding polit-
ical questions, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), and in suggesting, pp. 
70-71, that Justice Jackson applied the political question doctrine in his dissent in Korematsu 
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managed to keep all its options effectively open. 
Instead Keynes proceeds with an elaborate analysis of modem 
"political question" cases, all of them Vietnam-era lower court deci-
sions. He offers a complex four-fold categorization of those cases, 
and discusses at length several examples of each type (pp. 120-32). 
Unfortunately, this reviewer found the categories, and the criteria 
for assigning a case to a given category, very difficult to understand. 
Furthermore, the dates of decision do not seem to support Keynes's 
suggestion of a chronological trend toward increasing judicial activ-
ism. In fact, dicta aside, these decisions provide little evidence of 
activism at all. Keynes's fourth category, the only one in which the 
courts are said to have reached the merits, consists of two district 
court decisions that were reversed on appeal. 16 When it comes to the 
bottom line, Keynes is forced to conclude on a note of keen disap-
pointment. The "conventional wisdom" turns out to be correct: the 
courts are extremely reluctant to reach the merits in war-powers 
cases; and when they do, they are nearly certain to uphold executive 
action: 
[J]udicial opinion continues to promote the development of a virtually 
unlimited national war power. . . . . [T]he courts have acted as a mid-
wife to the birth of constitutional dictatorship in the United 
States. . . . [O]pponents of constitutional dictatorship should not 
await a judicial David to slay an executive Goliath. [P. 159-60]. 
Before invoking the Federal judiciary's assistance, opponents of presi-
dential warmaking should recall that the judiciary is likely either to 
tolerate or to support the exercise of executive power. In the future, 
opponents of presidential warmaking should focus their opposition on 
Congress rather than the Federal courts. [P. 175]. 
This is strong language, but where the courts are concerned, it seems 
entirely justified. The harsh truth is that there are precious few mod-
em cases that in any way curtail presidential powers in foreign and 
military affairs. The few that do17 are neither sweeping in scope nor 
of unquestionable validity in today's climate. On the other side may 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Consider Jackson's concluding sentence: "I would re-
verse the judgment and discharge the petitioner." 323 U.S. at 248. 
16. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 
1973) (challenge to the legality of military activities in Cambodia presents a nonjusticiable 
political question); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), revd, 464 F.2d 178 
(9th Cir. 1972) (three servicemen did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
use of military personnel in Cambodia). 
17. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (government had 
not met heavy burden of showing cause for prior restraint on the publication of a classified 
study of Vietnam policy); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (denial of passport without due 
process due to alleged Communist associations not a valid exercise of the war power); Youngs• 
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (president does not, as commander-in-
chief, have the power to take possession of private property to prevent labor dispute from 
stopping production of military goods); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (power to protect 
war effort against espionage does not imply power to detain a loyal citizen). 
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be counted numerous bulwarks of monarchism.18 Most of the cases 
fall outside Keynes's rather narrow definition· of his subject and are 
not discussed, but their inclusion would only reinforce the conclu-
sion he has reached. 
As for his advice that opponents of presidential warmaking focus 
their efforts on Congress, Keynes provides little reason for optimism 
that such efforts would succeed. Indeed, his historical overview 
makes clear that so far neither Congress nor the courts has provided 
sufficient restraints on the expansion of presidential power. Unfortu-
nately, he says little by way of explanation or of cure. Rather, he 
seems content to present and analyze doctrinal pronouncements, ab-
stracted from the political and social context in which they appear -
as if no one had any other concern but the correct expounding of 
constitutional and legal texts. This is typical of academic legal stud-
ies; and it may be unfair to take an author to task for not having 
written an entirely different sort of book. Still, one wishes Keynes 
had gone further. 
The Thomases' book, The War-Making Powers of the President, 
also seeks to describe the state of the law on presidential war-making 
powers, but it differs from Keynes's effort in several respects. It is 
even more legalistic in approach, to the point that historical narra-
tive is breathtakingly terse and political analysis almost absent. Yet 
it goes well beyond judicial opinion in its coverage, reporting a vari-
ety of other official and academic positions on the issues. It pays 
close attention to the doctrines of international law and their impact 
on domestic law. It reviews in detail the arguments for and against 
18. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 23, 1983) (congressional veto of 
Attorney General's order suspending deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
unconstitutional); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding authority of Secretary of State 
to revoke passports on determination that citizen's activities abroad are causing serious dam-
age to national security); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (former CIA agent held 
to have breached fiduciary duty for not submitting manuscript to agency for pre-publication 
review); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (unilateral abrogation of treaty by President 
a nonjusticiable political question) (plurality opinion); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166 (1974) (CIA Act not unconstitutional because it permits agency to account for expendi-
tures solely on director's certification); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (first amendment 
rights not violated by Army intelligence surveillance of political activity); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding executive exclusion of ~arxist scholar under Immi-
gration and Nationality Act); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.s: 1 (1952) (upholding Secre-
tary of Air Force's claim of military secrets privilege in tort action); Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (president has final authority over appli-
cations to engage in overseas and foreign air travel); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (upholding executive wartime order assigning persons of Japanese ancestry to reloca-
tion centers); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding that Congress and the 
president, acting together, could impose a wartime curfew on Japanese Americans); United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (Court will not review recognition of foreign governments 
or agreements made by president incident to recognition); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324 (1937) (affirming president's assignment, by executive agreement, of Soviet claims against 
Americans to United States); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936) (upholding presidential proclamation prohibiting arms sales to foreign power). 
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presidential power to take a variety of specific steps, such as armed 
intervention to protect American persons or property, and the inter-
ests of informal or treaty allies, against diverse threats. It includes a 
useful summary of presidential acknowledgments of congressional 
authority over the years, and of attempted congressional curbs on 
presidential action. 
Yet in the end, the Thomases seem to agree with Keynes that, for 
practical purposes, presidential warmaking is scarcely subject to the 
rule of law: "All in all, the power of the President to commit forces 
abroad remains a dark continent of American jurisprudence" (p. 
146). The very diversity, and sometimes downright craziness19 of the 
doctrinal claims they recount suggests that this is so, even though in 
some cases they are prepared to take firm stands on the issues. The 
courts, they agree, have largely "capitulated" to executive power (P. 
109); and congressional efforts to legislate curbs have so far been 
basically ineffective: 
The Mayaguez incident demonstrated that neither the funding limita-
tion nor the War Powers Resolution had diminished the ability of the 
President to act decisively in committing troops abroad. [P. 143]. 
[T]here has been no cutting back on the assertion of the power of the 
President to use force . . . [P]robably no President would refuse effec-
tively to defend what he thought was the country's best interest . . . . 
[P. 146]. 
The Thomases seem more hesitant to lament this result than does 
Keynes. At one point they worry that the War Powers Resolution 
could harm national security if it prevented presidents from threat-
ening to use force (p. 138). Their relief that it has not done so casts 
doubt upon the seriousness of their quest for constitutional balance, 
and thereby diminishes much of their study's potential impact. 
This brings us to a question seldom openly discussed: what, in 
the best of all plausible worlds, would be the impact of such studies 
as these? Of course their aim is educational, and the authors will 
have helped students, government legal advisors, and litigants to 
make more accurate, better documented and more subtle arguments, 
but to what end? Can abuses be effectively prevented or, failing that, 
redressed? 
Perhaps there have been times when presidents refrained from an 
action because of doubts about its legality; but this hardly seems to 
be common. Presidential advisers tend to be yea-sayers, unless they 
can point to decisive pragmatic reasons for holding back. Presidents 
know that strong action is usually popular, and that indecisiveness or 
appeasement are often devastating campaign issues. They are un-
19. E.g., the argument that forcible •1self-defense" may be justified by acts of "economic 
aggression" such as "manipulation of tariffs." P. 59. 
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derstandably more inclined to view foreign enemies as a menace to 
national interests than to see their own activities in such a light. 
When in doubt, security comes first. Thus such diverse personalities 
as Washington, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon all 
transcended legal barriers in the name of what they saw as a higher 
good. Congressional leaders too have appeared to use or to waive 
legal arguments, depending on the overriding political concerns of 
the moment. Such action need not be consciously cynical; for, bol-
stered by such materials as Keynes and the Thomases provide, one 
nearly always has legal arguments available that most would regard 
as nonfrivolous. One may urge, and convince oneself, that a given 
restraint on war-making power is unconstitutional; or that it does not 
apply to the specific plan at issue; or that one is entitled to deny the 
very existence of such a plan, effectively exempting it from the rule 
of law. If the President goes ahead and opponents press the legal 
issue, their chances for inflicting major costs in Congress, in court, or 
at the polls are limited. Many Americans have more taste for "nuk-
ing Iran" than for constitutional niceties. 
Still, we have not yet reached the stage where legal restraints can 
be openly :fl.outed without political cost; and a nonfrivolous argu-
ment may be a losing argument. Thus, to some extent legal objec-
tions are pragmatic objections, worth making and worth backing up. 
One might wish, though, for more self-consciousness than the pres-
ent authors display about the uses - or lack thereof - to which 
their studies lend themselves. 
Whatever scholarly writings may suggest, the present prospect 
for systemic legal reforms to curtail presidential warmaking seems 
bleak. Am.ending the Constitution to restr~in presidential power 
would attract few potent supporters. Even the disasters of Vietnam 
and Watergate, like those of the Federalists' "reign of terror," pro-
duced only a short-lived intere~t in structural reform. So long as the 
country's security and the leader's decency are not emphatically in 
doubt, we tend to feel, why tamper with a system that works? 
It may be that the level of congressional concern over existing 
weaknesses in statutory curbs, such as the loopholes facilitating con-
tinued covert operations against Nicaragua and the "rescue mission" 
in Grenada, or those created by the recent demise of the legislative 
veto, does make some small reform proposals politically viable. 
Continued executive demands for an even freer hand can and should 
be resisted. In particular, it must be insisted that repeated efforts to 
constrict the flow of information to the public, through such device~ 
as secrecy oaths, pre-publication review, visa denials, court injunc-
tions, and criminal sanctions are not immunized from constitutional 
scrutiny by the talisman of "national security," and indeed are inimi-
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cal to constitutional values.20 
In the end, though, the relation between structure and function is 
such that the tension between the national security state and demo-
cratic, constitutional procedures cannot be satisfactorily resolved. 
Neither an army nor a secretive, elite executive body is a democratic 
institution. From the founding until now, those in charge of national 
defense and foreign policy have openly resisted sharing information 
and power, arguing that broad participation would aid the nation's 
enemies by depriving our leadership of vital unity, :flexibility, knowl-
edge, vigor, secrecy, and dispatch. Two hundred years of ostensible 
democratization have had no visible impact on this aspect of our 
political life. We have repeatedly suffered major moral, material, 
and political upheavals in consequence; and today we face the ulti-
mate threat of nuclear annihilation. Whether or not our species is 
incurably warlike, the suspicion grows that enduring peace in the 
context of the nation-state system is a contradiction in terms. That 
we escaped previous wars with our Constitution apparently intact 
does not show that there is nothing amiss, nor that we can count on 
our luck holding in the future. Perhaps the Framers attempted the 
impossible in seeking to establish a durable republic in one country. 
But at the present, real disarmament and world government are both 
utopian dreams. 
In these circumstances, we would do well to guard the precarious 
cultural, institutional, and legal defenses against war that we do 
have. Whatever their flaws, the political processes in which such 
concepts as a rule oflaw, checks and balances, and the people's right 
to know find their traditional uses are about the only game in town. 
20. See M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET 87-102 (1977). 
